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for this course of action. The history over the centuries of stock investment
by the unsophisticated has not been particularly happy. If it could be assumed
that only pros played the stock market, the necessity for expensive and time-
consuming regulatory machinery would disappear. Professionals in smaller
numbers could be expected to look after their own interests; if they did not,
the social loss would not be great.
Obviously, this theoretical alternative is out of the question. Rising incomes
increase the pressure of investable funds. The pull of common stocks as an
inflationary hedge and higher income source is powerful, particularly for re-
tirement investment. To exclude the common man from these advantages would
be totally repugnant to the American dream. And it is generally agreed that the
nation must tap every available source of equity investment if it is to maintain
or arrive at an adequate rate of economic growth.3 Finally, the normal in-
centives of commercial expansion may be expected to spur the stock exchanges
and the brokers to sell their wares where they can. Barring serious depression,
public stock ownership will continue to grow.
"People's Capitalism" and "Corporate Democracy" are slogans with an
inverse relationship. Each expansion of the first undermines the second. Every
sale of common stock to a new small investor adds to the fractionation of share
ownership which lies at the root of the impotence of shareholder voting as a
check on management. Every extension of common stock ownership to an
inexperienced small investor adds to the ranks of those who may be expected
to lay claim, both politically and morally, to new legal protection of their
interests. Every victory for the cause of the Exchange's People's Capitalism
accelerates the development of new legal techniques designed to temper the
power of corporate management.
Joseph Livingston's book, though it does not say so, documents the end of
one era of corporate reform and foreshadows the beginning of the next.
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sion on Government Security. These are not only books but events in the
field they describe. For the authority of their sponsors entitles them to special
attention from those in the legislative, executive and judicial arms of the gov-
ernment who are required to deal with these matters.
Neither report would discard personnel security programs, although both
would somewhat reduce their scope. Both conclude that substantial reforms are
needed, including greater co-ordination of the numerous separate programs.
While both reports would make changes in the ultimate tests of loyalty and secu-
rity to be applied, the tests-so-called "standards" and "criteria"-would neces-
sarily remain vague. And they would still involve an ostensible inquiry into
character and attitudes intended to show a greater than average, or greater
than tolerable, probability of improper future activity-an inquiry fraught with
dangers and difficulties. Again, though both purport to grant the individual
charged a greater quantum of procedural rights, these would still necessarily be
somewhat curtailed. Faceless informers, though fewer, would still be with us.
In short, neither report would change the fundamental nature of personnel se-
curity programs. This is unavoidable, but it does not mean we should throw
up our hands in despair. Efforts to achieve some improvement are worth ex-
amining closely even though they cannot achieve the ideal.
A striking feature of both reports is the length to which they go to avoid con-
troversial reference. The existence of Senator McCarthy, for example, could
not be guessed from either. One gets only vague hints from the Commission
report, and none at all from the Bar's, that loyalty-security matters once were
a burning political issue or that there was such a phrase as "the numbers game."
This is quite understandable: both groups were concerned with finding the
widest possible area of agreement and with placing loyalty-security problems
on a plateau of cool deliberation. But this means that neither report will give
great aid to the future historian.
It means also that one cannot appraise Bar and Commission proposals for
substantive and procedural changes without taking account of a third compon-
ent of loyalty-security determinations, which we may call external factors-such
as political pressures, the temper of popular feeling, the attitude of security
adjudicators, and the fear of congressional review. While external factors can
enter into any adjudication, their potential play is obviously greatest where the
standards are necessarily vague and procedural rights are necessarily curtailed.
This, in turn, adds to the other considerable arguments that loyalty-security
programs, though needed, are a necessary evil and that their scope should be
restricted as narrowly as possible.
While the two reports have much in common, there are notable differences,
some real and some apparent. Under the latter heading, a general impression
seems to have developed that the scope of loyalty-security testing would be
materially expanded by the Commission's proposals but materially diminished
by those of the Bar. There is some basis for this impression but on analysis
it seems less than imposing. The major quantitative change would flow from
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both sets of proposals with respect to the Department of Defense's Industrial
Security Program, which requires security clearance for those employees of
government contractors having access to classified documents. Both Bar and
Commission would eliminate clearance for employees having access only to
"confidential" material. In fact, the Commission goes further to recommend com-
plete abolition of the "confidential" category, despite the universal views of
department officials to the contrary. The greatest apparent difference between
Bar and Commission relates to employees of the federal government. At first
reading, one gathers that the Bar recommends a "personnel security program"
limited to so-called sensitive positions, while the Commission recommends a
"loyalty" program for all federal employees. But this apparent contrast tends
to fade from view on closer examination of the details of the two proposals,
particularly in relation to civil service procedures, which the Bar contemplates
would continue to be used in examining all federal employees from a loyalty
standpoint.
The clearest differences between the two reports are those of form, style and
tone. Whereas the Bar report is a masterpiece of orderly concision, the Com-
mission's is sprawling, often prolix, and sometimes contradictory. It contains
a good deal of ore but one needs strength and patience to mine it. To be
sure, the Commission stakes out a larger area. It deals, as does the Bar, with
the various personnel programs covering government workers, employees of
government contractors, maritime workers under the Port Security Program
and employees of international organizations. It also, unlike the Bar, treats
passports, immigration and naturalization procedures, military personnel pro-
grams and civil air transport employees. Further, its official mandate required
the Commission to devote much of the bulk of its report to drafts of proposed
legislation, regulations and guides for decision.' Still, with these allowances, it
is not too much to say that the Commission report, far from superseding the
Bar's, has given it added utility; one really needs it as a guide and compass for
a tour through the Commission study.
For example, it is to the Bar report that one must turn for a compact and
orderly discussion of ends and means. We are reminded at the outset that per-
sonnel security programs are but one of several aspects of national security.
Among the others are "positive or dynamic security"--"the economic-political
system on which the strength and influence of the country have largely rested"2
-military security, international security and also, under the head of internal
security, punitive provisions and preventive measures, including personnel pro-
grams, against treason or espionage. The Bar is convinced that counterespion-
age is the most vital of the preventive measures.
Having established personnel programs as at most only a lesser part of our
true security measures, the Bar proceeds to catalog their defects. They are in-
jurious to our traditions of liberty and fair play; and they can defeat their own




ends by slowing scientific development, injuring relations with our allies and
inhibiting outspoken reports by government servants, particularly in the for-
eign service. These reminders, though hardly novel, help the reader place per-
sonnel security programs in proper perspective. They lead one naturally to the
ultimate conclusion that these programs have inherent defects and should thus
be confined as narrowly as possible, although the Bar seems to shrink from
putting the matter in quite these terms.
The Commission and its staff were clearly not oblivious of these basic con-
siderations, but they have provided no comparable aid to the thoughtful reader.
Some discussion of these questions can be found after a good deal of searching.
But one ends by feeling that the Commission recognized fewer of the inherent
defects of the programs and was less impressed by those that it saw. More-
over, the Commission seems to reject an approach based only on what serves
the interests of national security. For we are told that "where a reasonable
doubt as to loyalty exists, no person should be retained in Government service,
no matter how valuable his contribution might be." 3 This pronouncement
might be more persuasive if some infallible test existed for separating the loyal
from the disloyal.
The reports confirm several impressions about the operation of loyalty-
security programs: vast numbers of citizens have been affected by some form
of program, and the confusion and uncertainty caused by differing agencies,
standards and procedures are enormous. The product of statutory enactments
and executive orders during the last twenty years, broad scale loyalty-security
programs have largely developed since the Truman Executive Order No. 9835
in 1947, 4 which turned on a standard of loyalty. The Eisenhower Executive
Order No. 10450 5 is now in effect, positing not loyalty, but security suitability
as the proper standard. To give content to its test, the Order lists subjects of
information to be investigated, which 'have come to be called "criteria." One
general class bears upon dependability of an employee, a second upon his sub-
jection to "pressure which may cause him to act contrary to the best interests
of the national security," and a third upon acts and associations which tend to
show the person is disloyal. Still another class refers to "any criminal, in-
famous, dishonest, immoral or notoriously disgraceful conduct . ... 7 By its
terms, the Executive Order extends to all employees of the executive branch
the procedures of P.L. 733,8 which grants to heads of agencies the power to
suspend employees without pay, pendente lite. Although the Supreme Court
in Cole v. Young 9 limited the reach of the statute to sensitive positions, a sub-
stantial number of employees in the executive branch are still covered.
3. P.49.
4. 12FED.RE.1935 (1947).
5. IS FED. REG. 2489 (1953).
6. Exec. Order No. 10450, § 8(a) (1) (v), 18 FED. REG. 2491 (1953).
7. Id. § 8(a) (1) (iii).
8. 64 STAT. 476 (1950), 5 U.S.C. §§ 22-1 to -3 (1952).
9. 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
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A further complication-and one of considerable importance-lies in the fact
that federal employees may also be tested on loyalty and security grounds under
civil service procedures for determining general suitability for employment. In
fact, according to the Bar, civil service procedures have been used in over ninety
per cent of the alleged "security" cases.10 Under these procedures, unlike those
established by the Executive Order, a hearing is required only for veterans, a
group which now comprises about half the federal payroll. One wonders how
the choice has been made among available procedures. The Bar perhaps offers
a clue by quoting this notable statement in 1955 by the then Chairman of the
Civil Service Commission: "The firing business is merely the method of how
you get the man off the payroll after the agency head has reached the conclusion
he shouldn't be on it in the interests of the American people."1 1
There are still other factors of complexity and variation. The Executive
Order is implemented by separate regulations issued by each of some seventy-
odd executive agencies. Moreover, all this relates only to government em-
ployees. The variation in standards and procedures is multiplied when we look
at the federal programs for others, such as employees of government contrac-
tors.
Both Bar and Commission make recommendations for greater co-ordination
and uniformity. The Commission proposals would go somewhat the further
through creation of a Central Security Office which would, among other things,
provide a panel of full-time trial examiners. But the method seems ex\'treme to
cure a lack of co-ordination between departments. The title of the proposed
new agency has an ominous ring; and there is reason to fear that such an agency
might become too "security-minded," or at least be preoccupied with its box
score and continued existence. Moreover, it seems doubtful that the weighing
of individual facts in a security hearing involves an appropriate role for exper-
tise.
In their proposals with respect to standards and criteria for judgment, both
Bar and Commission would at least eliminate the pointless variation that now
exists among the various programs in their formulations of the concept of a
security risk. The two proposed security standards are similar though not
identical. Both are intended to encourage common-sense results by being less
encumbered by an apparent burden of proof than the present Executive Order,
under which clearance requires a finding that employment be "clearly consist-
ent with the interests of national security."'12
In so far as government employees are concerned, Bar and Commission seem
to part company. The Bar favors continuance of a security approach, while
the Commission advocates return to a loyalty standard, with all other security
10. P. 58.
11. Statement of the Hon. Phillip Young, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Con-
stitutimal Rights of the Seiate Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 806
(1955), quoted in THE Fu.Dula Loyur.,-ScuRaiT PROGRAa 58.
12. Exec. Order No. 10450, § 2, 18 FFu. REG. 2489 (1953).
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considerations being reserved for judgment of suitability for employment in
the civil service sphere. When seen in their total setting, however, the apparent
differences in approach become somewhat blurred; and the reasons advanced
in support of neither are wholly satisfying. The Bar argues that less stigma
would attach to discharges under a standard which does not isolate the factor
of loyalty; but this would hardly comfort those whose loyalty is not drawn into
question. The Commission, in advocating a loyalty standard seems, at times,
comfortably deluded by the belief that its recommendations for broader pro-
cedural rights would permit loyalty testing with real accuracy. Yet its confi-
dence seems to waver, for it recommends that where a choice exists civil service
procedures should be used.
Both Bar and Commission were understandably concerned with the way
evidence has been weighed, particularly in so far as it concerns membership and
other associations. Necessarily, much of what they say is hortative in nature,
but authoritative statements of what common sense should dictate may do some
good. Both reports warn that while a person's associations are relevant, they
should lead to no automatic conclusions. Both find grave defects in the Attor-
ney General's list, which are multiplied by the blind uses to which it has been
put not only in the federal programs but also by state, local and private groups.
Unless such defects can be remedied, the Bar would abolish the list; and the
Commission recommends drastic revision.
Perhaps the most troubled area of loyalty-security programs is procedure.
Both Bar and Commission advocate broader procedural rights; and, while they
might have gone further, their proposals, by contrast with the past, necessarily
tend toward improvement. Both reports emphasize the importance of confron-
tation of witnesses and are eloquent in dispraise of past practices under which
the right to a hearing has been seriously undercut by lack of subpoena power
and the government's general failure to produce its witnesses. Their recom-
mendations would probably lead to a greater measure of confrontation but how
much more cannot be said with assurance. While both Bar and Commission
would grant subpoena power, they would leave its exercise in the discretion of
the hearing body, even beyond the understandable case where the investigative
agency certifies that production of witnesses would destroy valuable sources of
secret information. Both groups, moreover, would continue the practice of
giving the hearing body only an advisory role and leaving the final say to the
agency head. A wiser answer, perhaps, would be to allow the agency head to
reverse only when the hearing body has recommended dismissal.
By way of further qualification of the procedural recommendations in the
sphere of government employees, it must be remembered that they would apply
only to proceedings under the security and loyalty programs which Bar and
Commission, respectively, have proposed. They would not affect dismissals
pursuant to civil service procedures.
The development and operation of federal loyalty-security programs sug-
gest that unfair procedures have been used with tragic costs both to individuals
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and to the ability of the federal government to retain and attract desirable em-
ployees. In the process, the values embodied in the first amendment have been
seriously damaged; the fear of being improperly classified as a "risk" has in-
hibited freedom of expression and association. One must assume also some
disservice to our larger national security interests, particularly through retard-
ing scientific advance.
While these evil effects would be reduced by the recommendations of both
Bar and Commssion, loyalty-security programs are in their nature an evil. The
Bar report at times comes close to saying so but ultimately shrinks from ex-
pressing this hard truth. Like the Commission, though in more modest tone, it
overstates the virtues of its recommended program as being "substantially free
of the weaknesses and defects which have appeared in connection with the pres-
ent programs."' 13 And it goes on to say that "national security would be ade-
quately protected and no reasonable citizen could feel that this was being
achieved at the sacrifice of our basic principles of liberty and our sense of fair-
ness."1 4 The statement goes too far. Both reports repeat the uniform rhetoric
of all official pronouncements in this area that the problem is one of reconciling
security requirements with our traditional concepts of liberty. But this clearly
implies that some sacrifice of cherished values-therefore some evil-is in-
volved. This is made no more attractive by quoting Cardozo to the effect that
the "reconciliation of the irreconcilable, the merger of antitheses, the synthesis
of opposites ... are the great problems of the law."' 5
The way the rhetoric is turned can make a difference: recognition of loyalty-
security programs as an evil forces a constant search for ways of reducing their
scope-a search which indeed seems to animate the Bar report. The most effec-
tive step is to eliminate loyalty-security testing entirely, wherever possible.
So far as federal employees are concerned, the Commission opposes any cut in
the scope of loyalty testing, whether or not the job involves any real risk to
national security interests, because "disloyalty should not be rewarded by the
prestige and emoluments of public employment."' 16 By contrast, the Bar pur-
ports to limit its proposed security program to "sensitive positions," which as
presently defined would cover about half a million persons, somewhat less than
twenty-five per cent of the total federal payroll. This also marks the area to
which the Supreme Court has, by statutory interpretation, restricted the pres-
ent program.17 But the force of the Bar's proposal-and perhaps the Court's
holding-becomes doubtful when the present "program" and the Bar's proposed
"program" are examined more closely; as noted, both seem to leave open the
possibility of loyalty or security testing under civil service procedures.
13. P. 17.
14. Ibid.
15. CARxozo, THE PAADoxEs OF LEGAL Sc~mcE 4 (1928), quoted in THE FED.RAL
LoYALTY-SEcuRIry PROGRAI 44.
16. P. 4.
17. Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
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A better approach would combine two suggestions that have been made in
some quarters: the elimination of all sensitive positions from civil service pro-
tection and the abolition of all loyalty or security tests for the balance of the
federal payroll. Those in sensitive positions would, of course, be subject to in-
vestigation from the standpoint of loyalty and other security factors. But since
dismissals from such positions would require no stated reasons, no necessity
would arise for branding anyone as disloyal or as a security risk. A further
effect would be to increase, from about fifteen to about thirty-three per cent,
the proportion of federal positions excepted from civil service. This fact, be-
sides eliminating loyalty testing of two thirds of all federal employees, would
probably make such a solution unpalatable to the Congress.
Another approach, which has been considerably discussed, is to reduce the
rigor of these programs by mitigating the sentence: to transfer the employee
to a nonsensitive job instead of firing him. This is apparently close to the
thinking of both Bar and Commission. Both groups propose this action while
a federal employee is under charges, and would welcome such a solution by
government contractors under the Industrial Security Program. Although
such an approach would necessarily be limited so long as loyalty testing affects
all federal employees-as contemplated by both Bar and Commission-it would
obviously form a significant part of any program which confined loyalty and
security testing to sensitive positions.
In the procedural area, abnormal curtailment of rights of confrontation and
cross-examination, in the interests of protecting vital sources of information,
should also be restricted. Some have suggested that the government should,
as in a criminal case, be required either to produce its witnesses or drop its
charges. This will simply not do with respect to positions which are really
"sensitive." But is it not a tenable view as to all other positions? It would
seem, moreover, a likely position of the Supreme Court if it ever rules on pro-
cedural due process in this area. In the nature of things, the Court would have
to work out a compromise which would whittle down due process standards to
the extent required by the real interests of national security. The Court might
well-and properly-say that a loyalty proceeding involving a nonsensitive job
requires the production of all witnesses.
-Where curtailment of rights of confrontation and cross-examination is neces-
sary, it should be offset as much as possible by special attempts to assist the
accused. The Bar and Commission reports would be worth while if they ac-
complished nothing more than elimination of the shocking procedure of sus-
pending employees without pay when charges are filed. Both reports recognize
the hardship involved in the many months typically elapsing between beginning
and end of a security proceeding, a hardship which often renders other pro-
cedural rights academic. And both are suggestive of further possibilities for
improving the lot of the accused. For example, the expenses of his witnesses
should be borne by the government in all cases, as the Bar proposes, not merely
when the suspect is ultimately cleared, as the Commission recommends. The
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same should be true of attorney's fees, which the Commission would deny, and
the Bar would grant only if the employee is cleared. The outcome should make
no difference since, with standards inherently vague and procedures less than
ideal, the result is imperfect at best.
What, finally, can be said of the overall value and effect of these two reports?
While neither set of proposals goes as far toward improvement as one might
wish, both would provide something more civilized than the present system.
But will any of the suggested improvements be given effect? And if so, is it too
late to do much good?
We learn from each report that the wholesale screenings and rescreenings
of federal employees have been completed, and that the programs applicable
to them have, since at least 1955, been concerned largely with applicants and
new employees. This certainly suggests that the major damage has already
been done. Still, the two reports are not wholly concerned with locking the
proverbial barn door after the horse has been stolen. There is a constant turn-
over in the federal payroll; and the national interest demands that talented
people not be repelled from seeking government positions. This gives special
importance to the proposals by both Bar and Commission of granting some
procedural rights to job applicants and probationary employees. Moreover,
it must be remembered that both reports deal with far more than federal em-
ployees. Most notably, the impact of their proposals with respect to the In-
dustrial Security Program would, if adopted, be quite considerable. And just
as the evils of the federal programs have been multiplied through imitation by
state, local and private measures, so also, one can hope, would be the proposed
improvements.
One hesitates to predict the chances of adoption of Bar and Commission
recommendations. For some time, proposals for legislative change have seemed
to be on dead center, with those for tightening and those for relaxing security
measures in apparent equilibrium. Still, the former pressure for ever broader
and tougher loyalty-security programs has materially abated. And one can
reasonably speculate that the launching of Sputnik may here, as well as in the
field of education, have stimulated some useful second thoughts.
If the point has in fact been reached where the cons as well as the pros of
security programs can be soberly considered and weighed, a focus for such
thinking is, by good fortune, at hand in the Bar and Commission reports. In
such an enterprise, the Commission's work is sure to be a standard reference.
One would hope the same of the Bar's. Its orderly analysis, comprehensive
references to variant points of view and competing values, and yet its extreme
concision, make it not only valuable in itself but also an almost indispensable
guide to the vast bulk of the Commission report.
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